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Abstract The journal of Cognitive Computation is defined
in part by the notion that biologically inspired computational
accounts are at the heart of cognitive processes in both
natural and artificial systems. Many studies of various
important aspects of cognition (memory, observational
learning, decision making, reward prediction learning,
attention control, etc.) have been made by modelling the
various experimental results using ever-more sophisticated
computer programs. In this manner progressive inroads have
been made into gaining a better understanding of the many
components of cognition. Concomitantly in both science and
science fiction the hope is periodically re-ignited that a man-
made system can be engineered to be fully cognitive and
conscious purely in virtue of its execution of an appropriate
computer program. However, whilst the usefulness of the
computational metaphor in many areas of psychology and
neuroscience is clear, it has not gone unchallenged and in
this article I will review a group of philosophical arguments
that suggest either such unequivocal optimism in computa-
tionalism is misplaced—computation is neither necessary
nor sufficient for cognition—or panpsychism (the belief that
the physical universe is fundamentally composed of ele-
ments each of which is conscious) is true. I conclude by
highlighting an alternative metaphor for cognitive processes
based on communication and interaction.
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Introduction
Over the hundred years since the publication of James’
psychology [1] neuroscientists have attempted to define the
fundamental features of the brain and its information-pro-
cessing capabilities in terms of (i) mean firing rates at
points in the brain cortex (neurons) and (ii) computations;
today the prevailing view in neuroscience is that neurons
can be considered fundamentally computational devices. In
operation, such computationally defined neurons effec-
tively sum up their input and compute a complex non-
linear function on this value; output information being
encoded in the mean firing rate of neurons, which in turn
exhibit narrow functional specialisation. After Hubel and
Wiesel [2] this view of the neuron as a specialised feature
detector has become treated as established doctrine. Fur-
thermore, it has been shown that richly interconnected
networks of such neurons can ‘learn’ by suitably adjusting
the inter-neuron connection weights according to complex
computationally defined processes. In the literature there
exist numerous examples of such learning rules and
architectures, more or less inspired by varying degrees of
biological plausibility; early models include [3–6]. From
this followed the functional specialization paradigm,
mapping different areas of the brain to specific cognitive
functions.
In this article I suggest that this attraction to viewing the
neuron merely as a computational device fundamentally
stems from (i) the implicit adoption of a computational
theory of mind (CTM) [7]; (ii) a concomitant functionalism
with respect to the instantiation of cognitive processes
[8, 9] and (iii) an implicit non-reductive functionalism with
respect to consciousness [10]. Conversely, I suggest that a
computational description of brain operations has difficulty
in providing a physicalist account of several key features of
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human cognitive systems (in particular phenomenal con-
sciousness and ‘understanding’) and hence that computa-
tions are neither necessary nor sufficient for cognition; that
any computational description of brain processes is thus
best understood merely in a metaphorical sense. I conclude
by answering the question What is cognition if not com-
putation? by tentatively highlighting an alternative meta-
phor, defined by physically grounded processes of
communication and interaction, which is less vulnerable to
the three classical criticisms of computationalism described
herein.1
The CTM
The CTM occupies one part of the spectrum of represen-
tational theories of mind (RTM). Although currently
undergoing challenges from dynamic systems, embodied,
enactivist and constructivist accounts of cognition (e.g.
[13–19]), the RTM remains ubiquitous in contemporary
cognitive science and experimental psychology. Contrary
to naive or direct realism, indirect realism (or representa-
tionalism) postulates the actual existence of mental inter-
mediaries—representations—between the observing
subject and the world. The earliest forms of RTM can be
traced to Descartes [20] who held that all thought was
representational2 and that it is the very nature of mind (res
cogitans) to represent the world (res extensa).
Harnish [7] observes that the RTM entails:
– Cognitive states are relations to mental representations
which have content.
– A cognitive state is:
– A state [of mind] denoting knowledge; understand-
ing; beliefs, etc.
– This definition subsequently broadened to include
knowledge of raw sensations, colours, pains, etc.
– Cognitive processes—changes in cognitive states—are
mental operations on these representations.
The Emergence of Functionalism
The CTM came to the fore after the development of the
stored program digital computer in the mid-20th century
when, through machine-state functionalism, Putnam [8, 9]
first embedded the RTM in a computational framework. At
the time Putnam famously held that:
– Turing machines (TMs) are multiply realisable on
different hardware.
– Psychological states are multiply realisable in different
organisms.
– Psychological states are functionally specified.
Putnam’s 1967 conclusion is that the best explanation of
the joint multiple realisability of TMs and psychological
states3 is that TMs specify the relevant functional states
and so specify the psychological states of the organism;
hence by this observation Putnam makes the move from
‘the intelligence of computation to the computational the-
ory of intelligence’ [7]. Today variations on CTM structure
the most commonly held philosophical scaffolds for cog-
nitive science and psychology (e.g. providing the implicit
foundations of evolutionary approaches to psychology and
linguistics). Formally stated the CTM entails:
– Cognitive states are computational relations to compu-
tational representations which have content.
– A cognitive state is a state [of mind] denoting
knowledge; understanding; beliefs, etc.
– Cognitive processes—changes in cognitive states—are
computational operations on these computational
representations.
The Problem of Consciousness
The term ‘consciousness’ can imply many things to many
different people. In the context of this article I refer spe-
cifically to that aspect of consciousness Ned Block terms
‘phenomenal consciousness’ [21], by which I refer to the
first person, subjective phenomenal states—sensory tickles,
pains, visual experiences and so on.
Cartesian theories of cognition can be broken down into
what Chalmers [10] calls the ‘easy’ problem of percep-
tion—the classification and identification of sense stim-
uli—and a corresponding ‘hard’ problem, which is the
realization of the associated phenomenal state. The
1 In two earlier articles (with Nasuto et al. [11, 12]) the author
explored theoretical limitations of the computational metaphor from
positions grounded in psychology and neuroscience; this article—
outlining a third perspective—reviews three philosophical critiques of
the computational metaphor with respect to ‘hard’ questions of
cognition related to consciousness and understanding. Its negative
conclusion is that computation is neither necessary nor sufficient for
cognition; its positive conclusion suggests that the adoption of a new
metaphor may be helpful in addressing hard conceptual questions
related to consciousness and understanding. Drawing on the conclu-
sions of the two earlier articles, the suggested new metaphor is one
grounding cognition in processes of communication and interaction
rather than computation. An analogy is with the application of
Newtonian physics and Quantum physics—both useful descriptions of
the world, but descriptions that are most appropriate in addressing
different types of questions.
2 Controversy remains surrounding Descartes’ account of the repre-
sentational content of non-intellectual thought such as pain.
3 Although Putnam talks about pain not cognition, it is clear that his
argument is intended to be general.
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difference between the easy and the hard problems and an
apparent lack of the link between theories of the former and
an account of the latter has been termed the ‘explanatory-
gap’.
The idea that the appropriately programmed computer
really is a mind, and was eloquently suggested by Chalmers
(ibid). Central to Chalmers’ non-reductive functionalist
theory of mind is the Principle of Organizational Invari-
ance (POI). This asserts that, ‘‘given any system that has
conscious experiences, then any system that has the same
fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively
identical experiences’’.
To illustrate the point Chalmers imagines a fine-grained
simulation of the operation of the human brain—a mas-
sively complex and detailed artificial neural network. If, at
a very fine-grained level, each group of simulated neurons
was functionally identical to its counterpart in the real
brain then, via Dancing Qualia and Fading Qualia argu-
ments, Chalmers (ibid) argues that the computational
neural network must have precisely the same qualitative
conscious experiences as the real human brain.
Current research into perception and neuro-physiology
certainly suggests that physically identical brains will
instantiate identical phenomenal states and, although as
Maudlin [22] observes this thesis is not analytic, something
like it underpins computational theories of mind. For if
computational functional structure supervenes on physical
structure then physically identical brains must be compu-
tationally and functionally identical. Thus Maudlin for-
mulates the Supervenience Thesis (ibid) ‘‘... two physical
systems engaged in precisely the same physical activity
through a time will support precisely the same modes of
consciousness (if any) through that time’’.
The Problem of Computation
It is a commonly held view that ‘there is a crucial barrier
between computer models of minds and real minds: the
barrier of consciousness’ and thus that ‘information-pro-
cessing’ and ‘phenomenal (conscious) experiences’ are
conceptually distinct [23]. But is consciousness a pre-
requisite for genuine cognition and the realisation of
mental states? Certainly Searle believes so, ‘‘... the study of
the mind is the study of consciousness, in much the same
sense that biology is the study of life’’ [24] and this
observation leads him to postulate the Connection Princi-
ple whereby ‘‘... any mental state must be, at least in
principle, capable of being brought to conscious aware-
ness’’ (ibid). Hence, if computational machines are not
capable of enjoying consciousness, they are incapable of
carrying genuine mental states and computation fails as an
adequate metaphor for cognition.
In the following sections I briefly review two well-
known arguments targeting computational accounts of
cognition from Penrose and Searle, which together suggest
computations are neither necessary nor sufficient for mind.
I subsequently outline a simple reductio ad absurdum
argument that suggests there may be equally serious
problems in granting phenomenal (conscious) experience
to systems purely in virtue of their execution of particular
programs; if correct, this argument suggests either strong
computational accounts of consciousness must fail or that
panpsychism is true.
Computations and Understanding: Go¨delian Arguments
Against Computationalism
Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem states that ‘‘... any
effectively generated theory capable of expressing
elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and
complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively
generated formal theory F that proves certain basic
arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is
true, but not provable in the theory.’’ The resulting true but
unprovable statement GðgÞ is often referred to as ‘the
Go¨del sentence’ for the theory (albeit there are infinitely
many other statements in the theory that share with the
Go¨del sentence the property of being true but not provable
from the theory).
Arguments based on Go¨del’s first incompleteness theo-
rem—initially from Lucas [25, 26] were first criticised by
Benacerraf [27] and subsequently extended, developed and
widely popularised by Penrose [28–31]—typically
endeavour to show that for any such formal system F,
humans can find the Go¨del sentence GðgÞ whilst the
computation/machine (being itself bound by F) cannot. In
[29] Penrose develops a subtle reformulation of the vanilla
argument that purports to show that ‘‘the human mathe-
matician can ‘see’ that the Go¨del Sentence is true for
consistent F even though the consistent F cannot prove
GðgÞ’’:
A detailed discussion of Penrose’s formulation of the
Go¨delian argument is outside the scope of this article (for
a critical introduction see [32, 33] and for Penrose’s
response see [31]); here it is simply important to note that
although Go¨delian-style arguments purporting to show
‘computations are not necessary for cognition’ have been
extensively4 and vociferously critiqued in the literature
(see [34] for a review), interest in them—both positive
and negative—still regularly continues to surface (e.g.
[35, 36]).
4 For example, Lucas maintains a web page http://users.ox.ac.uk/
*jrlucas/Godel/referenc.html listing more than 50 such criticisms.
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The Chinese Room Argument
One of the most widely known critics of computational
theories of mind is John Searle. His best-known work on
machine understanding, first presented in the 1980 paper
‘Minds, Brains & Programs’ [37], has become known as
the Chinese Room Argument (CRA). The central claim of
the CRA is that computations alone are not sufficient to
give rise to cognitive states, and hence that computational
theories of mind cannot fully explain human cognition.
More formally Searle stated that the CRA was an attempt
to prove the truth of the premise:
– Syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
Which, together with the following two axioms:
– (i) Programs are formal (syntactical).
– (ii) Minds have semantics (mental content).
... led Searle to conclude that:
– Programs are not minds.
... and hence that computationalism—the idea that the
essence of thinking lies in computational processes and that
such processes thereby underlie and explain conscious
thinking—is false [38].
In the CRA Searle emphasises the distinction between
syntax and semantics to argue that while computers can act
in accordance to formal rules, they cannot be said to know
the meaning of the symbols they are manipulating, and
hence cannot be credited with genuinely understanding the
results of the execution of programs those symbols com-
pose. In short, Searle claims that while cognitive compu-
tations may simulate aspects of cognition, they can never
instantiate it.
The CRA describes a situation where a monoglot Searle
is locked in a room and presented with a large batch of
papers covered with Chinese writing that he does not
understand. Indeed, Searle does not even recognise the
writing as Chinese ideograms, as distinct from say Japa-
nese or simply meaningless patterns. A little later Searle is
given a second batch of Chinese symbols together with a
set of rules (in English) that describe an effective method
(algorithm) for correlating the second batch with the first
purely by their form or shape. Finally Searle is given a
third batch of Chinese symbols together with another set of
rules (in English) to enable him to correlate the third batch
with the first two, and these rules instruct him how to return
certain sets of shapes (Chinese symbols) in response to
certain symbols given in the third batch.
Unknown to Searle, the people outside the room call the
first batch of Chinese symbols the script; the second batch
the story; the third questions about the story and the
symbols he returns they call answers to the questions about
the story. The set of rules he is obeying they call the
program. To complicate the matters further, the people
outside also give him stories in English and ask him
questions about them in English, to which he can reply in
English. After a while Searle gets so good at following the
instructions and the outsiders get so good at supplying the
rules which he has to follow, that the answers he gives to
the questions in Chinese symbols become indistinguishable
from those a true Chinese man might give.
From the external point of view the answers to the two
sets of questions—one in English the other in Chinese—are
equally good; Searle-in-the-Chinese-room has passed the
Turing test. Yet in the Chinese case Searle behaves like a
computer and does not understand either the questions he is
given or the answers he returns, whereas in the English
case he does. To highlight the difference consider Searle is
passed a joke first in Chinese and then English. In the
former case Searle-in-the-room might correctly output
appropriate Chinese ideograms signifying ‘ha ha’ whilst
remaining phenomenologically unmoved, whilst in the
latter, if the joke is funny, he may laugh out loud and feel
the joke within.
The decades since its inception have witnessed many
reactions to the CRA from the computational, cognitive
science, philosophical and psychological communities,
with perhaps the most widely held being based on what has
become known as the ‘Systems Reply’. This concedes that,
although the person in the room does not understand Chi-
nese, the entire system (of the person, the room and its
contents) does.
Searle finds this response entirely unsatisfactory and
responds by allowing the person in the room to memorise
everything (the rules, the batches of paper, etc.) so that there
is nothing in the system not internalised within Searle. Now
in response to the questions in Chinese and English there are
two subsystems—the native English speaking Searle and the
internalised Searle-in-the-Chinese-room—but all the same
he [Searle] continues to understand nothing of Chinese, and
a fortiori neither does the system, because there is nothing in
the system that is not just a part of him.
But others are left equally unmoved by Searle’s
response; for example in [39] Haugland asks why should
we unquestioningly accept Searle’s conclusion that ‘the
internalised Chinese room system does not understand
Chinese’, given that Searle’s responses to the questions in
Chinese are all correct? Yet, despite this and other tren-
chant criticism, almost 30 years after its first publication
there continues to be lively interest in the CRA (e.g.
[40–47]). In a 2002 volume of analysis [48] comment
ranged from Selmer Bringsjord who observed the CRA to
be ‘‘arguably the 20th century’s greatest philosophical
polariser’’ [49], to Rey who claims that in his definition
of Strong AI Searle ‘‘burdens the [Computational
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Representational Theory of Thought (Strong AI)] project
with extraneous claims which any serious defender of it
should reject’’ [50]. Nevertheless, although opinion on the
argument remains divided, most commentators now agree
that the CRA helped shift research in artificial intelligence
away from classical computationalism (which, pace Newell
and Simon [51], viewed intelligence fundamentally in
terms of symbol manipulation) first to a sub-symbolic
neural-connectionism and more recently, moving even
further away from symbols and representations, towards
embodied and enactive approaches to cognition. Clearly,
whatever the verdict on the soundness of Searle’s Chinese
room argument, the subsequent historical response offers
eloquent testament to his conclusion that ‘programs are not
minds’.
Dancing with Pixies
The core argument I wish to present in this article targeting
computational accounts of cognition—the Dancing with
Pixies (DwP) reductio—derives from ideas originally
outlined by Putnam [52], Maudlin [22], Searle [53] and
subsequently criticised by Chalmers [10], Klein [54] and
Chrisley [55, 56] amongst others5. In what follows, instead
of seeking to justify Putnam’s claim that ‘‘every open
system implements every finite state automaton’’ (FSA)
and hence that ‘‘psychological states of the brain cannot be
functional states of a computer’’, I will seek to establish the
weaker result that, over a finite time window, every open
physical system implements the trace of a FSA Q on fixed,
specified input (I). That this result leads to panpsychism is
clear as, equating FSA Q(I) to a specific computational
system that is claimed to instantiate phenomenal states as it
executes, and following Putnam’s procedure, identical
computational (and ex hypothesi phenomenal) states can be
found in every open physical system.
Formally DwP is a simple reductio ad absurdum argu-
ment that endeavours to demonstrate that:
– IF the assumed claim is true: that an appropriately
programmed computer really does instantiate genuine
phenomenal states
– THEN panpsychism holds
– However, against the backdrop of our immense
scientific knowledge of the closed physical world,
and the corresponding widespread desire to explain
everything ultimately in physical terms, panpsy-
chism has come to seem an implausible view...
– HENCE we should reject the assumed claim.
The route-map for this endeavour is as follows: in the
next section I introduce discrete state machines (DSMs)
and FSAs and show how, with input to them defined, their
behaviour can be described by a simple un-branching
sequence of state transitions. I subsequently review Put-
nam’s 1988 argument [52] that purports to show how every
open physical system implements every input-less FSA.
Then I apply Putnam’s construction to one execution trace
of any FSA with known input, such that if the FSA in-
stantiates genuine phenomenal states as it executes, then so
must any open physical system. Finally I apply the pro-
cedure to a robotic system that is claimed to instantiate
machine consciousness purely in virtue of its execution of
an appropriate program. The article is completed by a brief
discussion of some objections to the DwP reductio and
concludes by suggesting, at least with respect to ‘hard’
problems, that it may be necessary to develop an alterna-
tive metaphor for cognition to that of computation.
Discrete State Machines
In his 1950 paper ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’
[57] Turing defined DSMs as ‘‘machines that move in
sudden jumps or clicks from one quite definite state to
another’’ and explained that modern digital computers fall
within the class of them. An example DSM from Turing is
a simple machine that cycles through three computational
states Q1, Q2, Q3 at discrete clock clicks. Turing demon-
strated that such a device, which continually jumps through
a linear series of state transitions like clockwork may be
implemented by a simple discrete-position-wheel that
revolves through 120 intervals at each clock tick. Basic
input can be added to such a machine by the addition of a
simple brake mechanism and basic output by the addition
of a light that comes on when the machine is in, say,
computational state Q3 (see Fig. 1).
An input-less FSA is specified by a set of states Q and a
set of state-transitions Q ? Q0 for each current state Q
specifying the next state Q0. Such a device is trivially
implemented by Turing’s discrete-position-wheel machine
and a function that maps each physical wheel position Wn
to a logical computational state Qn as required. For
example, considering the simple 3-state input-less FSA
described in Table 1, by labelling the three discrete posi-
tions of the wheel W1, W2, W3 we can map computational
states of the FSA, Q1, Q2, Q3, to the physical discrete
positions of the wheel, W1, W2, W3, such that, for example,
(W1? Q1, W2? Q2, W3? Q3).
This mapping is observer relative; the physical position
W1 of the wheel could equally map to computational states
Q2 or Q3 and, with other states appropriately assigned,
the machine’s state transition sequence (and hence its
5 For early discussion of these themes see ‘Minds and Machines’,
4: 4, ‘What is Computation?’, November 1994.
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computational functionality) would remain unchanged. It is
central to this argument that all computational states are
observer relative in this fashion (i.e. they are not, contra
say mass, intrinsic to the physics of the system); compu-
tational state determination must always involve an
observer-specified function that maps from the physical
state of the system onto the computational state of the
machine.
Note, after Chalmers, that the discrete position wheel
machine described above will only implement a particular
execution trace of the FSA and Chalmers remains unfazed
at this result because he states that input-less machines are
simply an ‘‘inappropriate formalism’’ for a computation-
alist theory of mind [32].
More generally an FSA with input and output is speci-
fied by a set of states, a set of inputs, a set of outputs, and a
set of state-transitions (Q, I) ? (Q0, O) for each input/state
pair (Q, I), specifying the next state Q0 and the output O
that will be produced by that state and input (see Table 2).
Perhaps surprisingly, over a finite time period we can
similarly implement any FSA with a given (i.e. specified
a priori) set of input/output contingencies.
Over a specified time interval Turing’s discrete-posi-
tion-wheel machine can be made to implement an FSA
with particular input and output contingencies if there is a
mapping from the physical wheel positions onto formal
states of the FSA, and from inputs and outputs to the
system onto inputs and outputs of the FSA such that: for
every formal state-transition (Q, I) ?(Q0, O) in the speci-
fication of the FSA, if the physical discrete-position-wheel
machine is in a state Ws and receiving input i such that
f(Ws) = Q and f(i) = I, this causes it to transit into a state q
0
such that f(q0) = Q0 and to produce output o such that f(o)
= O.
Hence, although the operation of an FSA with input is in
general described by a series of contingent branching state
transitions which map from current state to next state, (Q,
I)? Q0, a priori knowledge of the input to the FSA over a
finite time interval entails that such contingent behaviour
can be unfolded like clockwork to a finite series of linear
state transitions. For example, if Turing’s 3-state FSA is
initially in state Q1 and the input (brake) is ON for two
subsequent clock ticks and then OFF for the next three, its
computational behaviour—its execution trace—is fully
described by the sequence of state transitions Q1? Q1?
Q1? Q2? Q3? Q1.
It is trivial to observe that we can fully implement this
particular trace of this particular FSA with this particular
input (I = BRAKE-ON1, BRAKE-ON2, BRAKE-OFF3,
BRAKE-OFF4, BRAKE-OFF5, BRAKE-OFF6) using a
six-position discrete state wheel, starting the wheel in
position W1 and using the following function to map from
physical wheel positions to computational states:
W1 _ W2 _ W3 _ W6 ? Q1
W4 ? Q2
W5 ? Q3
Thus, with a priori knowledge of input to the FSA over a
finite time interval we can trivially implement any FSA
with particular input–output contingencies by the use of a
simple mapping function to map from each physical wheel
position/state Wn to each logical computational state of the
FSA Qn and output (e.g. LAMP ON/OFF) as required.
Open Physical Systems
Discussed in a short appendix to Putnam’s 1988 mono-
graph ‘Representation and Reality’ is a brief argument that
endeavours to prove that every open physical system is a
realisation of every abstract FSA and hence that function-
alism fails to provide an adequate foundation for the study
of the mind.
Fig. 1 Turing’s discrete 3-state wheel machine
Table 1 Three-state input-less FSA
Previous state Q1 Q2 Q3
Next state Q2 Q3 Q1
Table 2 Three-state FSA with simple input
Previous FSA state
Input Q1 Q2 Q3
Brake-OFF Q2 Q3 Q1
Brake-ON Q1 Q2 Q3
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Central to Putnam’s argument is the observation that
every open physical system, S, is in different states at every
discrete instant and hence can be characterised by a dis-
crete series of non-cyclic natural state transitions [s1, s2...
st... sn]. Putnam argues for this on the basis that every such
open system, S, is continually exposed to electromagnetic
and gravitational signals from, say, a natural clock. Hence
by quantising these natural states appropriately, every open
physical system can by considered as a generator of dis-
crete non-repeating state sequences, [s1, s2... s?].
Thus, reconsidering Turing’s 3-state FSA machine over
the fixed interval [t1... t6], starting in state Q1, with
input (I = BRAKE-ON1, BRAKE-ON2, BRAKE-OFF3,
BRAKE-OFF4, BRAKE-OFF5, BRAKE-OFF6) known
a priori, it is trivial to observe that, over time interval [t1...
t6], if we map the FSA state Q1 to the disjunction of open
physical system states, [s1 _ s2 _ s3 _ s6], FSA state Q2 to
open physical system state s4 and FSA state Q3 to open
physical system state s5, then the open physical system will
fully implement the execution of the FSA (Q, I) as it
transits open physical system states [s1... s6] over time
interval [t1 ... t6].
To show that being in state Q1 at time t1 caused the open
physical system to enter FSA state Q1 at t2, we observe that
at t1 the open physical system is in state s1 (which the
mapping function labels FSA state Q1) and that being in
state s1 at t1 causes the open physical system to enter state
s2 (which the mapping function also labels FSA state Q1) at
t2, etc. Hence, given the current state of the open physical
system at time t and the mapping function we can easily
predict its future state and hence how the states of FSA
evolve over the time interval under observation.6
Robots, Pixies and Panpsychism
At the heart of the computationalist’s putative conscious
robot there lies a computational system; typically a
microprocessor, memory and memory-mapped peripherals.
Such a system is effectively a very sophisticated DSM/
FSA. Hence, if the input to the robot is fixed and specified
over a finite time interval we can, pace Putnam, map the
execution trace of the robot’s control program onto the
state evolution of any open physical system; thus, if the
robot instantiates genuine phenomenal consciousness
purely in virtue of its execution of its control program, so
must the state evolution of any open physical system;
hence the computationalist—if his claims are correct—
leads us to embrace panpsychism, with phenomenal con-
sciousnesses—ethereal pixies—dancing everywhere.
Objections
The Argument from Repeatability
The DwP reductio is grounded upon the notion that, for a
finite period with all input known, the state transitions of a
robot’s control program can be mapped onto any [suitably
large] discrete-position-wheel such that, if the robot
instantiates phenomenal states merely in virtue of its exe-
cution of its control program, then so must any [suitably
large] digital wheel or, pace Putnam, any open physical
system.
Hofstadter, in a critique of the CRA [58], objects that we
can only perform this type of mapping a posteriori, i.e. we
can only map the robot’s computational states onto the
physical states of the system after the program has exe-
cuted and hence know the computational states it gener-
ates. Hence Putnam’s construct is not a ‘real mapping’ and
this type of argument is simply ‘not science’.
However, although Hofstadter is clearly correct to
highlight that Putnam style mappings can only be applied
a posteriori, this is irrelevant to the force of the DwP
reductio. Consider a simple experiment (1) where a robot is
presented with a specific stimulus—say a bright red square
in the centre of its visual field—over a finite time period
T1... Tk, with the robot subsequently reporting that it per-
ceives a vivid red square; the computationalist will assert
that over this period T1... Tk the robot instantiated the
phenomenal states associated with experiencing the bright
red square precisely in virtue of the execution of its control
program operating on this red square input.
Now, imagine a second experiment (2) using exactly the
same automaton, over exactly the same length time interval
T1... Tk, with exactly the same input, I1... Ik. As the
experimental setup is precisely the same for experiment (2)
as for experiment (1) the computationalist must continue to
claim that the robot continues to instantiate appropriate
phenomenological states over this period and it is clear that
a posteriori knowledge of the system input does not impact
this claim.
But, given the vagaries inherent in any real-world
experiment, how can we ensure that the input to the robot
will be exactly the same in both experiments? One pos-
sible solution could be to simply ensure that the appro-
priate digital values are always stored on the robot’s
visual sensor-transducer (e.g. by disconnecting genuine
optical input to the frame store and simply ensuring that
vivid-red pixel values are stored appropriately in its
memory map).
6 In [32], Chalmers critiques Putnam’s construction, noting that it
fails to ensure that all states of the FSA are reliably transited;
however, he subsequently demonstrates (ibid) that every physical
system containing a ‘clock’ and a ‘dial’ will implement every input-
less FSA.
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A second possibility is to simply run the entire experi-
ment as a virtual simulation (i.e. to use a virtual robot in a
virtual reality). Clearly for the computationalist such a
virtual simulation cannot impact the putative phenomenal
states of the [now virtual] robot; as long as the input to the
robot and its control program remain the same, appropriate
contingent state transitions will occur, hence instantiating
appropriate ‘phenomenal states’ in the robot.
Computational States Are not Observer-Relative but
Are Intrinsic Properties of any Genuine Computational
System
In addressing this objection I will initially consider the
most primitive of computational systems—a simple two
input/single output logic gate X, with physical behaviour
fully specified by a table of voltage levels (see Table 3).
It is apparent that under mapping A (see Table 4), the
gate X computes the logical AND function. Conversely,
under mapping B (see Table 5), it is apparent that the gate
X computes the logical OR function.
It follows that, at a fundamental level in the physical
realisation of any logical system, such observer-relativity
must hold: the computational function of the system must
be contingent on the observer-determined mapping used.7.
Furthermore it is clear that, even if the physical-to-
computational mapping is known, the precise function of
the system-as-a-whole remains fundamentally observer-
relative: that is, ‘‘different answers grow from the concerns
of different individuals.’’8 Consider (a) a chess playing
computational machine used to control the position of
chess pieces in a game against, say, a human opponent and
(b) the same program being used to control the illumination
of a strip of coloured lights—the two-dimensional chess
board being mapped to a one-dimensional strip of lights
where the colour of each light is contingent on the value
(king, knight, pawn, etc.) of the piece mapped onto it—in
an interactive art exhibition; clearly, to paraphrase Witt-
genstein, the meaning of a computation is contingent on its
use.
The Objection From Randomness
Superficially the DwP reductio only targets DSMs; it has
nothing to say about the conscious state of suitably engi-
neered Stochastic Automata [60]. In a stochastic automaton
the future state of the machine is determined by a proba-
bility distribution which determines, given the current state
(and any input), the probability of entering any subsequent
state. Thus the tuple hQ, I, O, P(q’,o|q,i)i represents a sto-
chastic automaton where Q denotes the set of states, I the
set of input symbols, O the set of output symbols and
P(q’,o|q,i) the transition probabilities that the stochastic
automaton transitions from state s [ S to state s0 [ S and
outputs symbol o [ |O provided that i [ I was the input
symbol.
It is trivial to show that (a) in the theory of computation
stochastic automata are no more powerful9 than deter-
ministic automata [61] and that (b) there exist techniques to
decompose a stochastic automaton into a sequential com-
bination of automata such that every stochastic automata
can be decomposed into a controlled random source and a
deterministic automaton [60]. A controlled random source
is a single state stochastic automaton hQ, I, O, Po|ii that
returns an output symbol o [ O given i [ I (where the
output q0 becomes the input to the subsequent deterministic
automaton).
Clearly pseudo-random symbols generated by computer
cannot truly be random; however, what is required to
implement a stochastic automaton is merely that a finite
segment of the generated symbols must be statistically
indistinguishable from a truly random sequence for a
suitably long period of time and there exist many well-
defined methods to accomplish this (for discussion see
[62]). Hence over a finite period the behaviour of two
machines, one whose state evolution is determined by a
Table 3 Circuit behaviour
Input-1 (V) Input-2 (V) Output (V)
0 0 0
0 5 0
5 0 0
5 5 5
Table 4 Mapping A
5 V Computational state true
0 V Computational state false
Table 5 Mapping B
0 V Computational state true
5 V Computational state false
7 Although it is true that as the complexity of the logical system
increases, the number of consistent computational functions that can
be assigned to it diminishes, it remains the case that its computational
properties will always be relative to the threshold logic value used;
the physicalstate ? computationalstate mapping will always deter-
mine the logical-function that the physical computational system
instantiates.
8 Cf. ‘What is a word-processor?’, in Winograd and Flores [59].
9 The set of languages ‘acceptable’ by a stochastic automaton and a
deterministic automaton is the same.
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genuine random source (e.g. ‘Shot’ noise) the other by
pseudo-random simulation, can be made indistinguishable.
Thus, for the ‘objection from randomness’ to hold, any
putative phenomenal states of the system must be contin-
gent upon epiphenomenal properties of the underlying
noise source and not the actual stochastic computational
system.
Removing Contingencies
In the study of Bishop [63] I discuss several objections to
the DwP reductio with perhaps the most potent coming
from Chalmers who argues that ‘‘Humans do not have a
single path of states along which their lives are determined.
... For any given sequence of states that a human goes
through, it remains the case that if things in the world had
gone slightly differently, they would have functioned in an
interestingly different way. Omitting this potentiality
leaves out a vital part of the description of human func-
tioning. A wind-up toy or perhaps a videotape of my life
could go through the same sequence of states, but it would
not be a cognitive system. Cognition requires at least the
possibility of functioning in more than one way’’ [32].
My initial response to this line of argument [64] is
analogous to that first outlined by Maudlin [22] who,
through application of the supervenience thesis, similarly
questions the relevance of counterfactual-involving condi-
tionals to conscious experience. If one blocks the connec-
tion that supports some counterfactual conditional in a
currently static part of the system, is it plausible that this
could change or remove the system’s conscious experi-
ence? Maudlin argued that it could not.10
In the study of Bishop [64], I argue from a physicalist/
engineering perspective that the mere deletion of state
sequences—that given fixed input to the robot will never be
entered—cannot affect the phenomenal states in the robot.
In outline, consider what happens if a putative conscious
robot R1 with full counterfactual sensitivity is step-by-step
transformed into new robot R2, such that its resulting
behaviour is determined solely by a linear un-branching
series of state transitions; substituting each conditional
branching state transition sequence in the evolution of R1
with a linear state transition defined by current state and the
(a priori) specified input. It is clear that, over a finite time
interval and with identical input, the phenomenal experi-
ence of R1 and R2 must be the same. Otherwise we have a
robot, Rn, (R1\ Rn B R2), whose phenomenal experience
is somehow contingent upon the presence or absence in the
automaton of a series of potential state transitions that are
never entered, contravening the supervenience thesis.
Two responses to this conclusion, from Chrisley and
Chalmers, tackle two distinct concerns regarding the above
argument. The first, from Chalmers, is Functionalist: from
this perspective the moment R1 and R2 cease to encapsulate
the same fine-grained functional organisation they,
through the POI, cease to have the same underlying phe-
nomenal states. That is it is not the presence or absence of
individual non-entered state transitions sequences which
affects the phenomenal states of the robots, but the con-
comitant constriction of the supervening fine-grained
functional organisation [10].
The second, from Chrisley, is Physicalist: from this
perspective, as everything supervenes only on the physical,
the mere removal of non-entered state transition sequences
does not in-itself affect the phenomenal states of the
machine. However, at the ‘Toward a Science of Con-
sciousness’ conference in Tucson 2006 Ron argued that as
we morph between R1 and R2 with the deletion of each
conditional non-entered state sequence substantive physical
differences between R1 and R2 will emerge.
11 Effectively,
with each replacement of the non-entered conditional state
sequences, we crucially modify or delete the concomitant
[machine/object code]conditional test and branch instruc-
tions hence R1 and R2 gradually become two distinct
physical systems—one will always execute each condi-
tional state transition contingent on its (fixed) input before
entering Q0, the second simply entering Q0 directly—and so
the DwP reductio no longer holds.
Is Counterfactual Sensitivity Essential to a Computational
Account of Cognition?
To respond to Chalmers and Chrisley’s concerns I will
consider a real robot R1 operating under tightly controlled
experimental conditions and a virtual robot R2, an exact
replicant of R1, operating in a virtual reality (VR)
10 ‘‘Suppose that a system exists whose activity through a period of
time supports a mode of consciousness, e.g. a tickle or a visual
sensum. The supervenience thesis tells us that, if we introduce into the
vicinity of the system an entirely inert object that has absolutely no
causal or physical interaction with the system, then the same activity
will support the same mode of consciousness. Or again, if the activity
of a system supports no consciousness, the introduction of such an
inert and causally unconnected object will not bring any phenomenal
state about if an active physical system supports a phenomenal state,
how could the presence or absence of a causally disconnected object
effect that state?’’ [22].
11 In his article, ‘Counterfactual computational vehicles of con-
sciousness’ [56] Chrisley states, ‘‘Bishop’s main mistake: claiming
that differences in counterfactual behaviour do not constitute physical
differences. Presumably, it is by virtue of some physical difference
between a state of R1(n) and the corresponding state of R1(n?1) that
gives the former a counterfactual property the latter lacks. Note that to
delete the nth transition, one would have to physically alter R1(n-1). So
despite Bishop’s claim, if R1 and R2 differ in their counterfactual
formal properties, they must differ in their physical properties. Causal
properties (even counterfactual ones) supervene on physical
properties.’’
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simulation of R1’s experimental environment. Both robots
have a complex visual pathway leading from their real/
virtual sensors to their computational visual cortex (e.g. a
neural network) with which to perceive their environment.
In each of the following experiments the robots are
instructed to report the colour of a large red square fixed in
the centre of their visual field.
For the real robot operating in the real world this entails
obtaining a succession of values from its optical transducer
that correspond to the lighting conditions in its visual field;
employing image processing algorithms to isolate the
square then abstracting the array of values that define its
colour. Finally these values are passed to the robot’s visual
cortex enabling it to report back the colour of the square.
Ex hypothesi the virtual robot, being an exact replication
of the real robot in a precisely rendered virtual simulation
of the real world, will perform exactly the same compu-
tational operations, extracting exactly the same array of
colour values to pass to its visual sub-system, before it is
also able to report the colour of the square. Hence, when
we run the experiment, as both robot’s control programs
are exactly the same and the robots receive identical data
from their environments, both robots will report seeing the
vivid red square and both will experience identical phe-
nomenal sensations (if any); if the square had been say
deep purple in both the real and virtual worlds, then both
robots would have reacted contingently and reported the
change.
Next the virtual robot software is re-complied using
two slightly different partial evaluation compilers [65] A
and B to produce two new virtual robot systems R2a and
R2b. It follows that for the two virtual robots, in virtue of
the two partial evaluation compilers pre-computing all
static/known input at compile time, knowledge of the
fixed virtual input—the large red square—will enable the
compilers to appropriately improve the efficiency of their
object code.
The first partial evaluation compiler, compiler A, pre-
evaluates the values of all the variables active in the robot’s
visual pathway and deletes all unutilised object code
including any redundant conditionals. This is analogous to
the situation described in ‘‘Removing contingencies’’.
In the second instance the partial evaluation compiler B
also pre-evaluates the values of all the variables active in
the robot’s visual pathway, but this time merely deletes the
un-utilised object code on the consequent side of each
conditional that forms part of the robot’s visual pathway,
leaving all the conditional statements (with their anteced-
ents) in situ; in this scenario although each conditional
continues to be evaluated, because the input to the robot is
fixed by the experimental conditions that pertain in the
virtual environment—the large red square—the value of
each antecedent is fixed and hence only one arm of the
conditional consequent ever executed (the non-executed
arm being deleted at compile time as before).
In all three cases—the original compiler and partial
evaluation compilers A and B—it follows that all robots
respond appropriately by indicating that they perceive the
large vivid red square in the centre of their visual field.
However, comparing the phenomenal states of R1 in
comparison to R2a, because the compiled (machine) code
executed by R1 and R2a is physically distinct, both Chrisley
and Chalmers can claim the DwP reductio does not hold.
Conversely, considering the phenomenal states of R1 in
comparison to R2b, because the compiled code that is
actually executed by both robots is identical, the two
physical systems are engaged in precisely the same phys-
ical activity throughout the time period and Maudlin’s
supervenience thesis applies. Hence, R1 and R2 must sup-
port precisely the same modes of consciousness (if any)
through that time and the DwP reductio holds.12
Lastly, it has been suggested that the DwP reductio
directed towards a known conscious system (e.g. human
brain states sampled above their Nyquist rate [66]) con-
tinues to hold; hence we must conclude that either pan-
psychism is true or—even more alarmingly—that the
human brain is not conscious. However the reductio targets
computationalism—the formal abstraction and instantia-
tion of consciousness through appropriate DSMs (and/or
their stochastic variants); the DwP reductio does not target
continuous [dynamic] systems or identity theories (where
conscious properties of the system are defined to be irre-
ducible from the underlying physical agent–environment
system). For the defender of the computational metaphor to
simply assume the brain is a DSM is circulus in probando.
Are These A Priori Critiques of the Computational
Metaphor too Strong?
The three a priori arguments discussed in this article pur-
port to show that computations are neither necessary nor
sufficient for cognition; specifically that the execution of
mere computations does not instantiate genuine under-
standing or phenomenal consciousness and hence that there
12 It is also clear that in this case the ‘system as a whole’ (i.e. the
environment, robot and VR and compiler) remains sensitive to
counterfactuals—if we had pre-specified the experimental conditions
to be a dull blue square, the partial evaluation compiler B would have
modified object code accordingly—hence at the level of the system,
Chalmers’ POI continues to apply. Interestingly, as this form of
compile time partial evaluation process cannot be undertaken for the
real robot, the DwP reductio strictly no longer holds against it;
however, this does not help the computationlist as any putative
phenomenal states of the real robot have now become tightly bound to
properties of the real-world agent/environment interactions and not
the mere computations.
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are limits to the use of the computational metaphor in
cognitive science; but perhaps this conclusion is too
strong?
How Do the A Priori Arguments Discussed Herein
Accommodate the Important Results Being Obtained
Through Computational Neuroscience to Cognition?
There are two responses to this question, one weak and one
strong. The first—the weak response—emerges from the
Chinese room and DwP reductio. It acknowledges the huge
value that the computational metaphor plays in current
psychology and neuroscience and even concedes that a
future computational neuroscience may be able to simulate
any aspect of neuronal processing and offers insights into
all the workings of the brain. However, although such a
computational neuroscience will result in deep under-
standing of cognitive processes there is a fundamental
ontological divide between the simulation of a thing and
the thing itself. That is we may simulate the properties of
gold using a computer program but such a program does
not automatically confer upon us riches (unless of course
the simulation becomes duplication; an identity). Hence
Searle’s famous observation that ‘‘… the idea that com-
puter simulations could be the real thing ought to have
seemed suspicious in the first place because the computer
is not confined to simulating mental operations, by any
means. No one supposes that computer simulations of a
five-alarm fire will burn the neighbourhood down or that a
computer simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all
drenched. Why on earth would anyone suppose that a
computer simulation of understanding actually understood
anything?’’ [37].
The second—the stronger response—suggests that there
may be principled reasons why it may not be possible to
adequately simulate all aspects of neuronal processing
through a computational system; there are bounds to a
computational neuroscience. Amongst others this position
has been espoused by: Penrose (see section ‘‘Computations
and understanding: Go¨delian arguments against computa-
tionalism); Copeland claims the belief that ‘‘the action of
any continuous system can be approximated by a TM to
any required degree of fineness ... is false’’13; and Smith
[68] outlines results from ‘Chaos theory’ which describe
how ‘Shadowing theorems’ fundamentally limit the set of
chaotic functions that a TM can model to those that are
‘well-behaved’; functions that are not well-behaved cannot
be computationally described.
Both of the above responses accommodate results from
computational neuroscience, but clearly both also highlight
fundamental limitations to the computational metaphor.
So what Is Cognition, If Not Computation?
In this article I have argued from an a priori perspective
that it is time for the hegemony of the computational
metaphor in Cognitive Science to be challenged; a tentative
suggestion for an alternative metaphor for cognitive pro-
cesses—one based on communication and interaction—has
been suggested (see Nasuto et al. [11, 12]). This metaphor,
based on communication and interaction, potentially offers
the following advantages over the computational metaphor:
firstly, from a theory-of-computation perspective, there is
evidence that ‘Interaction Machines’ are computationally
more powerful than (TM) algorithms and hence may
escape Penrose style criticisms [69]; secondly, a metaphor
based on communication and interaction does not explicitly
perform discrete computations on discrete representa-
tions—symbol manipulations—in the classical cognitivist
way and hence is much less vulnerable to CRA/DwP
arguments; finally, communication—as a new biological
information processing metaphor—could more efficiently
and compactly describe complex neuronal operations and
provide us with a better intuitive understanding of the
meaning of these operations [12]. In contrast to computa-
tion, communication is not merely an observer-relative
anthropomorphic projection on reality, as even simple
organisms (e.g. bacteria) communicate with each other or
interact with their environment. Thus the new metaphor—
cognition as communication—is sympathetic to modern
post-symbolic, anti-representationalist, embodied, enactive
accounts of cognition such as those from Brooks [70],
Varela [19], O’Regan [15], Thompson [71] and Bishop and
Nasuto [13].
Conclusion
All matter, from the simplest particles to the most complex
living organisms, undergo physical processes which in
most sciences are not given any special interpretation.
However, when it comes to nervous systems the situation
changes abruptly. In neuroscience, and in connectionism, it
is assumed that neurons and their systems possess special
computational capabilities; this is equivalent to claiming
that a spring, when extended by a moderate force, com-
putes its deformation according to Hooke’s law. In this
13 Copeland’s argument is detailed, but at heart he follows an
extremely simple line of reasoning: consider an idealised analogue
computer that can add two reals (a, b) and output one if they are the
same, zero otherwise. Clearly either (a) or (b) could be non-
computable numbers (in the specific formal sense of non-Turing-
computable numbers). Hence clearly, there exists no TM that, for any
finite precision (k), can decide the general function F(a = b) (see [67]
for detailed discussion of the implications of this result).
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article I initially highlighted the ubiquity of this compu-
tational metaphor in the Cognitive Sciences before
reviewing two well-known arguments that together purport
to demonstrate that computation is neither necessary nor
sufficient for cognition; I subsequently introduced a less
well-known reductio—DwP—that endeavours to demon-
strate that if computations can instantiate consciousness,
then panpsychism is true and consciousness is everywhere.
Taken together I conclude these arguments offer serious
a priori reason to question the computational hegemony in
cognitive science.
Conversely, an alternative metaphor grounded on com-
munication has recently been suggested by Nasuto [11]. In
this preliminary study we claim that treating neurons as
communicating—rather than computing—with each other
more accurately captures their complex, and to us funda-
mental, capability of modifying their behaviour depending
on context. Furthermore, and in contrast to computation,
we claim that communication is not merely an observer-
relative anthropomorphic projection on reality, as even
simple organisms (e.g. bacteria) communicate with each
other or interact with their environment. Finally, although
it has been robustly demonstrated that populations of
simple communicating organisms can solve complex
problems in optimisation and search [72, 73]; although the
role of communication in human development and in social
interactions cannot be overestimated [74]; although com-
munication has advantages over computation as a metaphor
for ‘hard’ problems of cognition—clearly much more
research is required (to define, ground and develop the new
metaphor) before communication (like consciousness) is
‘taken seriously’.
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